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Abstract
While great progress has been made at making neural
networks effective across a wide range of visual tasks, most
models are surprisingly vulnerable. This frailness takes the
form of small, carefully chosen perturbations of their input,
known as adversarial examples, which represent a security
threat for learned vision models in the wild – a threat which
should be responsibly defended against in safety-critical
applications of computer vision. In this paper, we advo-
cate for and experimentally investigate the use of a fam-
ily of logit regularization techniques as an adversarial de-
fense, which can be used in conjunction with other methods
for creating adversarial robustness at little to no marginal
cost. We also demonstrate that much of the effectiveness
of one recent adversarial defense mechanism can in fact
be attributed to logit regularization, and show how to im-
prove its defense against both white-box and black-box at-
tacks, in the process creating a stronger black-box attack
against PGD-based models. We validate our methods on
three datasets and include results on both gradient-free at-
tacks and strong gradient-based iterative attacks with as
many as 1,000 steps.
1. Introduction
Neural networks, despite their high performance on a va-
riety of tasks, can be brittle. Given data intentionally chosen
to trick them, many deep learning models suffer extremely
low performance. This type of data, commonly referred to
as adversarial examples, represent a security threat to any
machine learning system where an attacker has the ability
to choose data input to a model, potentially allowing the
attacker to control a model’s behavior.
At the same time, applications of computer vision are
pervasive, with future applications including autonomous
driving and medical diagnostics. While these use cases of
vision are exciting in their potential for societal good, they
also have the potential to be grave threats when behaving
erroneously, with undesired behavior able to cause harm to
both their users and creators. It is therefore of critical im-
portance to understand how to defend against such adversar-
ial attacks, both to prevent these systems from failing and to
prevent malicious actors from exploiting any vulnerabilities
they may have. Though challenging, this is nonetheless an
urgent need, as it is already known that attacks targeting sys-
tems for autonomous driving and medical diagnostics are
possible [6, 7].
Today, adversarial examples are typically created by
small, carefully chosen transformations of data that models
are otherwise high-performant on. While this is primarily
due to the ease of experimentation with existing datasets [8],
the full threat of adversarial examples is indeed only limited
by the ability and creativity of an attacker’s example gener-
ation process – for example, even relatively basic research
has shown the potential for adversarial attacks in the physi-
cal world [15], with more attacks being found on a regular
basis.
Even with the limited threat models considered in cur-
rent research, performance on adversarially chosen exam-
ples can be dramatically worse than unperturbed data. One
canonical example is the CIFAR-10 image classification
task [14], where white-box accuracy on adversarially cho-
sen examples is lower than 50%, even for the most robust
defenses known today [16, 13], while unperturbed accuracy
can be as high as 98.5% [3], a 30× difference in misclas-
sification rate. On larger tasks, such as ImageNet [20], the
difference is even bigger, as no model is known to be robust
to any but the weakest of all adversarial attacks.
Current defenses against adversarial examples generally
come in one of a few flavors. Perhaps the most com-
mon approach is to generate adversarial examples as part of
the training procedure and explicitly train on them, known
as “adversarial training”. Another approach is to trans-
form the model’s input representation in a way that thwarts
an attacker’s adversarial example construction mechanism.
While these methods can be effective, care must be taken
to make sure that they are not merely obfuscating gradi-
ents [2]. Last, generative models can be built to model
the original data distribution, recognizing when the input
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data is out of sample and potentially correcting it [23, 21].
Of these, arguably the most robust defenses today follow
the adversarial training paradigm, of which adversarial logit
pairing [13] is the most recent incarnation, extending the ad-
versarial training work of Madry et al. [16] by incorporating
an additional term to make the logits (pre-softmax values)
of an unperturbed and adversarial example more similar.
In this work, we show that adversarial logit pairing de-
rives a large fraction of its benefits from regularizing the
model’s logits toward zero, which we demonstrate through
simple and easy to understand theoretical arguments in ad-
dition to empirical demonstration. Investigating this phe-
nomenon further, we examine two alternatives for logit reg-
ularization, finding that both result in improved robustness
to adversarial examples, sometimes surprisingly so – for
example, using the right amount of label smoothing [25]
can result in greater than 40% robustness to a 10-step pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD) attack [16] on CIFAR-10
while training only on the original, unperturbed training ex-
amples, and is also a compelling black-box defense. We
then present an alternative formulation of adversarial logit
pairing that separates the logit pairing and logit regulariza-
tion effects, improving the defense. The end result of these
investigations is a defense that outperforms state-of-the-art
approaches for PGD-based adversaries on CIFAR-10 for
both white-box and black-box attacks, while requiring little
to no computational overhead on top of adversarial training.
2. Overview of Adversarial Training
Before proceeding with our analysis, we review existing
work on adversarial training for context. While adversar-
ial examples have been examined in the machine learning
community in some capacity for many years [4], their study
has drawn a sharp focus in the current renaissance of deep
learning, starting with Szegedy et al. [26] and Goodfellow
et al. [9], particularly in the context of computer vision. In
Goodfellow et al. [9], adversarial training is presented as
training with a weighted loss between an original and ad-
versarial example, i.e. with a loss of
J˜(θ, x, y) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
αJ(θ, x(i), y(i))+
(1− α)J(θ, g(x(i)), y(i))
(1)
where g(x) is a function representing the adversarial ex-
ample generation process, originally presented as g(x) =
x +  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)), α is a weighting term between
the original and adversarial examples typically set to 0.5,
θ are the model parameters to learn, J is a cross-entropy
loss, m is the dataset size, x(i) is the ith input example, and
y(i) is its label. Due to the use of a single signed gradient
with respect to the input example, this method was termed
the “fast gradient sign method” (FGSM), requiring a sin-
gle additional forward and backward pass of the network to
create. Kurakin et al. [15] extended FGSM into a multi-
step attack, iteratively adjusting the perturbation applied to
the input example through several rounds of FGSM. This
was also the first attack that could be described as a variant
of projected gradient descent (PGD), where the adversarial
perturbation is initialized to zero. Both of these approaches
primarily target an L∞ threat model, where the L∞ norm
between the original and adversarial example is constrained
to a small value. By keeping the L∞ norm small, it is as-
sumed that the adversarial example will have the same cor-
rect label as the original example, i.e. that the perturbation
is small enough to still be easily recognizable as the origi-
nal category, an assumption that allows for research in the
field without requiring the manual annotation of every new
adversarial example.
Madry et al. [16] built upon these works by initializ-
ing the search process for the adversarial perturbation ran-
domly, and is among the strongest attacks currently avail-
able. Although only a slight modification of Kurakin et
al. [15], this detail is critical – with a zero initialization it is
easy to become robust only at existing training points, thus
causing a “gradient masking” effect [2]. Through exten-
sive experiments, they showed that even performing PGD
with a single random initialization is able to approximate
the strongest adversary found with current first-order meth-
ods, and doing adversarial training with this attack resulted
in the most robust model yet. However, as with multi-
step FGSM, performing adversarial training with this ap-
proach can be rather expensive, taking an order of magni-
tude longer than standard training. Specifically, PGD-based
adversarial training requires N + 1 forward and backward
passes of the model, where N is the number of PGD itera-
tions, and is typically on the order of 5 to 20 [16].
Improving on PGD-based adversarial training, Kannan
et al. [13] introduced adversarial logit pairing (ALP), which
adds a term to the adversarial training loss function that en-
courages the model to have similar logits for original and
adversarial examples:
J˜(θ, x, y) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
αJ(θ, x(i), y(i))+
(1− α)J(θ, g(x(i)), y(i))+
λL(f(x(i); θ), f(g(x(i)); θ)).
(2)
where L was set to an L2 loss and f(x, θ) returns the
logits of the model corresponding to example x. Adversar-
ial logit pairing has the motivation of increasing the amount
of structure given to the model in the learning process by
encouraging the model to have similar prediction patterns
on the original and adversarial examples, a process reminis-
cent of distillation [11].
Kannan et al. [13] also studied a baseline version of ALP,
called “clean logit pairing”, which paired randomly chosen
unperturbed examples together. Surprisingly, this worked
reasonably well, inspiring them to experiment with a sim-
ilar idea they call “clean logit squeezing”, regularizing the
L2 norm of the model’s logits, which worked even more
effectively, though this idea itself was not combined with
adversarial training. It is this aspect of the work that is most
related to what we study in this paper.
Last, it is worth noting work examining the reproducibil-
ity of adversarial logit pairing [5]. While it is true that ALP
was found to not actually be robust on ImageNet to multi-
step white-box attacks with a large number of iterations,
continuing the trend of no models being robust on Ima-
geNet, the improved robustness of ALP on smaller datasets
that are more commonly used was not refuted, a fact which
we also find, even with attacks of up to 1,000 steps. Thus,
we believe that ALP shows some promise in advancing our
understanding and effectiveness in defending against adver-
sarial examples.
3. Adversarial Logit Pairing and Logit Regu-
larization
We now show how adversarial logit pairing [13] acts as a
logit regularizer. For notational convenience, denote `(i)c as
the logit of the model for class c on example i in its original,
unperturbed form, and ˜`(i)c as the logit for the corresponding
adversarial example. The logit pairing term in adversarial
logit pairing is a simple L2 loss:
L =
1
2
(`(i)c − ˜`(i)c )2 (3)
While it is obvious that minimizing this term will have
the effect of making the original and adversarial logits more
similar in some capacity, what precise effect does it have
on the model during training? To examine the effect of
such a loss in gradient-based training, the dominant train-
ing paradigm for almost all computer vision models today,
we can look at the gradient of this loss term with respect to
the logits themselves:
∂L
∂`
(i)
c
= `(i)c − ˜`(i)c (4)
∂L
∂ ˜`
(i)
c
= ˜`(i)c − `(i)c (5)
Under the assumption that the adversarial example
moves the model’s predictions away from the correct label
(as should be the case with any reasonable adversarial ex-
ample, such as an untargeted PGD-based attack), we will
have that `(i)c > ˜`
(i)
c when c = y(i) is the correct category,
and `(i)c < ˜`
(i)
c otherwise1. Keeping in mind that model up-
dates move in the direction opposite of the gradient, then
the update to the model’s weights will attempt to make the
original logits smaller and the adversarial logits larger when
c = y(i) and will otherwise attempt to make the original
logits larger and the adversarial logits smaller.
However, it is not sufficient to examine this in isolation,
as logit pairing is only one component of a typical adverar-
ial loss: it must be considered in the context of the adversar-
ial training loss J˜ – in particular, the cross-entropy loss used
in J˜ for the adversarial example g(x(i)) already encourages
the adversarial logits to be higher for the correct category
and smaller for all incorrect categories, and furthermore the
scale of the loss J˜ typically is an order of magnitude larger
than the adversarial pairing loss. Thus, we argue that the
main effect of adversarial logit pairing is actually in the re-
maining two types of updates, encouraging the logits of the
original example to be smaller for the correct category and
larger for all incorrect categories – an effect which is essen-
tially regularizing model logits in a manner similar to “logit
squeezing” [13] or label smoothing [25].
Examining this further, we can also take a different per-
spective by explicitly incorporating the scale of the logits in
the logit pairing term. If we factor out a shared scale factor
γ from each logit, the logit pairing term has the form
L =
1
2
(γ`(i)c − γ ˜`(i)c )2 (6)
implying that
∂L
∂γ
= γ(`(i)c − ˜`(i)c )2, (7)
Since (`(i)c − ˜`(i)c )2 is non-negative, this means that the
model will always attempt to update the scale γ of the logits
in the opposite direction of its sign, which is necessarily an
update moving γ toward zero so long as the logits were not
identical – in fact, if this were the only term in the loss, then
it is easy to see that γ = 0 would be a global minimizer of
the loss. However, in practice this affect is partially coun-
terbalanced by the adversarial training term, which requires
that logits across different categories be different in order to
minimize its cross-entropy loss.
Given this interpretation, in this work we now explore
four key questions: 1) Experimental verification of our anal-
ysis. In practice, how much of a logit regularization effect
does ALP have? 2) Do other forms of logit regularization
have similar effects on adversarial robustness? If so, then
1While it is theoretically possible that the logits for an incorrect cate-
gory are smaller in a loss-maximizing adversarial example, increasing their
value, all else equal, will result in a higher loss, so `(i)c < ˜`
(i)
c will typi-
cally hold.
an entire family of methods for improving adversarial ro-
bustness will have been found. 3) Is it possible to decouple
adversarial logit pairing explicitly into a form where the ef-
fect of logit regularization and pairing can be disentangled?
4) Finally, using these insights, can we discover even more
robust models?
3.1. Experimental Evidence
Perhaps the most straightforward way to test our hypoth-
esis is to examine the logits of a model trained with ALP
vs one trained with standard adversarial training. If our hy-
pothesis is true, then the model trained with ALP will have
logits that are generally smaller in magnitude. We present
the results of this experiment in Figure 1(left), using an 18-
layer ResNet [10] classifier trained on CIFAR-10 [14] as
our experimental testbed (see Sec. 5.1 for details).
As shown in Figure 1, it is indeed the case that the log-
its for a model trained with ALP are of smaller magnitude
than those of a model trained with PGD, with a variance re-
duction of the logits from 8.31 to 4.02 on clean test data2.
Though this provides evidence that ALP does have the ef-
fect of regularizing logits, this data alone is not sufficient
to determine if logit regularization is a key mechanism in
ALP’s improved adversarial robustness.
To answer this, we examine if standard adversarial train-
ing can be improved by explicitly regularizing the logits.
If adversarial robustness can be improved, but similar im-
provements can not be made to ALP, then at least some of
the benefits of ALP can be attributed strictly to logit regu-
larization. We present the results of this experiments in Fig-
ure 1(right), implemented using the “logit squeezing” form
of regularization (L2-regularization on the logits).
As shown, we find that incorporating regularization on
model logits is able to recover slightly more than half of the
total improvement from logit pairing, with a unimodal dis-
tribution – too little regularization has only a small effect,
and too much regularization approaches the point of being
harmful. In contrast, when added to a model already trained
with ALP, regularizing the logits does not lead to any im-
provement at all, and in fact hurts performance at all levels
of regularization strength, likely due to the combination of
explicit logit regularization and the implicit regularization
happening from ALP overpowering the cross-entropy loss
of adversarial training. This evidence makes clear that one
of the key improvements from logit pairing is due to a logit
regularization effect.
We would like to emphasize that these results are not
meant to diminish ALP in any sense – our goals are to in-
vestigate the mechanism by which it works and explore if it
can be generalized or improved. Thus, given these results,
it is worth examining other methods that have an effect of
2The corresponding distributions on a set of PGD-based adversarial ex-
amples are very similar.
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Figure 1. Left: Distribution of logits on clean test data for models
trained with and without logit pairing. Right: Performance against
a 10-step PGD attack for models trained with varying amounts of
logit regularization, with and without logit pairing.
regularizing logits in order to tell whether this is a more
general phenomenon.
4. Other forms of logit regularization
Label Smoothing. Label smoothing is the process of re-
placing the one-hot training distribution of labels with a
softer distribution, where the probability of the correct class
has been smoothed out onto the incorrect classes [25]. Con-
cretely, label smoothing uses the target distribution:
p(i)c =
{
1− s c = y(i)
s
C−1 c 6= y(i)
(8)
where p(i)c is the target probability for class c for example i,
the number of categories is denoted byC, and s ∈ [0, 1− 1C ]
is the smoothing strength. Label smoothing was originally
introduced as a form of regularization, designed to prevent
models from being too confident about training examples,
and had the goal of improved generalization. Furthermore,
it can be easily implemented as a preprocessing step on the
labels, and does not affect model training time in any sig-
nificant way. Interestingly, Kurakin et al. [15] found that
incorporating a small amount of label smoothing present in
a model trained on ImageNet actually decreased adversarial
robustness roughly by 1%. Here we find a different effect.
In Figure 2(left) we show the effect label smoothing
has on the performance of a model trained only on clean
(i.e. non-adversarial) training data. Very surprisingly, us-
ing only label smoothing was able to produce a model that
is nearly as robust to this 10-step PGD attack as models
trained with PGD-based adversarial training or adversarial
logit pairing, both of which take an order of magnitude more
time to train – though in faireness we note that when PGD
and ALP-based models are trained only on adversarial ex-
amples rather than a mixture of clean and adversarial data,
their robustness exceeds this performance by around 5%.
Furthermore, this benefit of label smoothing comes at no
significant loss in accuracy on unperturbed test data, while
generally adversarial training tends to trade off original vs
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Figure 2. Left: Clean and adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 as a function of the label smoothing strength. Note that models for this figure
were trained exclusively on the original training data – no adversarial examples were involved in the training procedure. Top-Right: Logit
distribution of model trained with no label smoothing (middle) and with label smoothing of s = .75 (right), evaluated on the original test
images. Bottom-Right: Logit distributions when evaluated on PGD-based adversarial examples.
adversarial performance. Another curiosity is that adding
in any label smoothing at all dramatically improves robust-
ness to FGSM-based adversaries (adding label smoothing of
s = .01 brought accuracy up from 6.1% to 38.3%), while
PGD-based attacks saw much more gradual improvement
with label smoothing strength. While remarkable, this prop-
erty of label smoothing on the loss surface is eludes under-
standing, warranting further research.
Examining the logits themselves (Figure 2, right), we see
a striking difference between the models – the model trained
with label smoothing both has a dramatically smaller dy-
namic range of logits – roughly 1.2 vs. 20, a 16-fold de-
crease – and also presents a much more bimodal logit dis-
tribution than the model trained without label smoothing.
In other words, it has learned to predict extremely consis-
tent values for logits, a property that may contribute to its
adversarial robustness. Anecdotally, we observed that this
behavior held for all positive values of s, with a stronger
effect the higher s was.
This behavior can be explained: when trained with no la-
bel smoothing, the cross-entropy loss used in most models
encourages model output to be as close to a one-hot distribu-
tion as possible, predicting a probability of 1 for the correct
category and 0 for all other categories. When viewed as log-
its instead of probabilities, this corresponds to pushing the
logits for the correct and incorrect categories as far apart
as possible. However, models trained with label smoothing
are instead encouraged to produce a soft distribution, with
no probabilities too close to either 0 or 1, corresponding to
a bounded target logit difference which gets smaller with
increasing s.
Additional experiments involving label smoothing are
given in Section 5.
Paired-Example Data Augmentation Recently, a new
form of data augmentation was found that stands in contrast
to standard label-preserving data augmentation. Paired-
example data augmentation consists of combining differ-
ent training examples together, dramatically altering both
the appearance of the training examples and their labels.
Introduced concurrently by multiple groups [29, 12, 27],
these types of data augmentation typically have the form
of element-wise weighted averaging of two input examples
(typically images), with the training label also determined
as a weighted average of the original two training labels
(represented as one-hot vectors). Besides making target la-
bels soft (i.e. not 1-of-K) during training time, these meth-
ods also encourage models to behave linearly between ex-
amples, which may improve robustness to out of sample
data. Interestingly, Zhang et al. [29] found that this type
of data augmentation improved robustness to FGSM-based
attacks on ImageNet [20], but Kannan et al. [13] found that
the method did not improve robustness against a targeted
attack with a stronger PGD-based adversary.
Experimentally, we found evidence agreeing with both
conclusions – when applying mixup [29], we found a size-
able increase in robustness to FGSM adversaries, going
from 6.1% on CIFAR-10 by training without mixup to
30.8% with mixup, but did not observe a significant change
when evaluated against a PGD-based adversary. While ro-
bustness to a PGD adversary with only 5 steps increased
by a tiny amount (from 0.0% to 0.5%), robustness to a 10-
step PGD adversary remained at 0%. In our experiments,
we use VH-mixup, the slightly improved version of mixup
introduced by Summers and Dinneen [24].
4.1. Decoupling Adversarial Logit Pairing
While we have now considered alternate methods by
which logits can be regularized, at this point it is still not
clear exactly how they might be used with or interact with
the logit regularization effect of adversarial logit pairing.
Doing so requires decoupling the logit pairing and logit reg-
ularization effects of ALP.
In adversarial logit pairing [13], the logit pairing term is
implemented as an L2 loss:
L(f(x(i); θ), f(g(x(i)); θ)) = ‖f(x(i))− f(g(x(i)))‖2,
(9)
though other losses such as an L1 or Huber loss are also
possible. Expanding this creates a form that makes the pair-
ing and regularization terms evident:
L(f(x(i); θ), f(g(x(i)); θ)) =
‖f(x(i))‖2 − 2f(x(i))T f(g(x(i))) + ‖f(g(x(i)))‖2,
(10)
where the first and third terms are explicit logit regulariza-
tion terms on f(x(i)) and f(g(x(i))), and the logit pair-
ing effect is only determined by the middle inner product.
While using an L2 loss is a natural loss for regularization
purposes, the pairing term can be improved by considering
a more general form:
L(f(x(i); θ), f(g(x(i)); θ)) =
h(f(x(i)), f(g(x(i)))) + β(‖f(x(i))‖2 + ‖f(g(x(i)))‖2),
(11)
where h has the express goal of making the logits more sim-
ilar (with as little logit regularization as possible), and the
regularization terms have been grouped with a controllable
weighting factor. There are several natural choices for h,
such as the Jensen-Shannon divergence, a cosine similar-
ity, or any similarity metric that does not have a significant
regularization effect. We have found that simply taking the
cross entropy between the distributions induced by the log-
its was effective – depending on the actual values of the
logits, this can either still have a mild squeezing effect (if
the logits are very different), a mild expanding effect (if the
logits are very similar), or something in between.
One implementation detail worth noting is that it can be
difficult to reason about and set the relative strengths of the
pairing loss and adversarial training loss. To that end, we
set the strength of the pairing loss h as a constant fraction of
the adversarial loss, implemented by setting the coefficient
of the loss as a constant multiplied by a non-differentiable
version of the ratio between the losses.
By decomposing adversarial logit pairing explicitly into
logit pairing and logit regularization terms in this way, ad-
versarial robustness to a 10-step PGD attack improves by
an absolute 1.9% over ALP, or 5.6% over PGD-based ad-
versarial training.
5. Additional experiments
In this section we present additional experiments on
three datasets: The primary two datasets are CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100, which are datasets for 10-way and 100-way
classification, respectively, each with 50,000 examples, on
which we evaluate both white-box and black-box adver-
sarial attacks. Additionally, we evaluate on SVHN [17],
which has significantly greater scale in training examples
(604,388) and whose 10 classes have an uneven distribution,
with the most common class roughly 3 times more common
than the least common class.
5.1. Implementation Details
In the experiments throughout this paper on CIFAR-
10/100, we used an 18-layer ResNet [10], equivalent to the
“simple” model of Madry et al. [16], with a weight decay
of 2 · 10−4 and a momentum optimizer with strength of 0.9.
Standard data augmentation of random crops and horizon-
tal flips was used. After a warm up period of 5 epochs, the
learning rate peaked at 0.1 and decayed by a factor of 10 at
100 and 150 epochs, training for a total of 200 epochs for
models not trained on adversarial examples and 101 epochs
for models using adversarial training – adversarial accuracy
tends to increase for a brief period of time after a learning
rate decay, then quickly drop by a small amount, an empir-
ical finding also echoed by Schmidt et al. [22]. The mini-
batch size was 128.
Adversarial examples were constrained to a maximum
L∞ norm of .03, and all PGD-based attacks used a step
size of 0.0078. For our implementation of adversarial logit
pairing, on CIFAR-10 we used a pairing coefficient of 0.5
as recommended by [13], and found a larger coefficient of
5.0 more effective on CIFAR-100.
On SVHN, a smaller 8-layer ResNet was used for com-
putational efficiency due to the scale of the dataset, which
is a considerable challenge to overcome with adversarial
training. Models were trained for 101 epochs, with a learn-
ing rate of .001 for the first 5 epochs, .01 until epoch 80,
and .001 afterward. Data augmentation consisted of random
crops after an initial 4 pixel padding. Adversarial attacks on
SVHN were performed with anL∞ constraint on the pertur-
bation of 12/255 with a step size of 3/255. All adversarial
attacks were constructed using the CleverHans library [18],
implemented in TensorFlow [1], and all experiments were
done on two Nvidia Geforce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs.
Table 1. White-box accuracy of models on CIFAR-10.
Adversary
Training Method Natural FGSM PGD(5 steps)
PGD
(10 steps)
PGD
(20 steps)
Regular Training 87.4% 6.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Label Smoothing 86.9% 54.7% 49.4% 41.7% 34.4%
PGD [16] 75.8% 50.5% 51.0% 46.1% 45.3%
ALP [13] 74.0% 52.6% 53.6% 49.1% 48.5%
LRM (ours) 68.5% 52.8% 53.8% 51.4% 51.0%
5.2. Towards a more robust model
Given these forms of logit regularization, perhaps the
most natural question is whether they can be combined to
create an even more robust model. Thus, in this section
we focus exclusively on making a model (and compara-
ble baselines) as robust as possible to PGD-based attacks.
In particular, for baseline methods (PGD-based adversarial
training [16] and adversarial logit pairing [13]), we opt to
train exclusively on adversarial examples, effectively set-
ting α = 0 in Equation 1, which roughly trades off 4− 5%
accuracy for clean test examples for a similar gain in adver-
sarial performance.
To combine the logit regularization methods together, on
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 we use a modest amount of la-
bel smoothing (s = 0.1) and use VH-mixup [24] on the
input examples. For the logit pairing formulation presented
in Section 4.1, we found different hyperparameters worked
best on our two evaluation datasets. On CIFAR-10, we
set β = 10−3, and set the ratio between the adversarial
training loss and the pairing loss to 0.125, which focuses
the loss on keeping adversarial and original examples sim-
ilar. On CIFAR-100, the more challenging dataset, we use
β = 3 · 10−5 and a ratio of 0.95, which allows the net-
work to focus more on fitting the data while still maintain-
ing a balance with defending against adversarial examples.
On SVHN, we set s = 0.2, use β = 10−4, employ regu-
lar mixup [29] (which is more suitable for the imagery of
SVHN), and use a ratio of 0.95, similar to CIFAR-100. We
note that these parameters were not tuned much due to re-
source constraints. We refer to this combination simply as
LRM (“Logit Regularization Methods”).
CIFAR-10 White-box performance on CIFAR-10 is
shown in Table 1. LRM achieves the highest level of ad-
versarial robustness of the methods considered for all PGD-
based attacks, and to the best of our knowledge represents
the most robust method on CIFAR-10 to date. However, like
other adversarial defenses, this comes at the cost of perfor-
mance on the original test set, which makes sense – from
the perspective of adversarial training, a clean test image is
simply the center of the set of feasible adversarial exam-
ples. Nonetheless, it is interesting that the tradeoff between
adversarial and non-adversarial performance can continue
to be pushed further, with the optimal value of that tradeoff
dependent on application, i.e. whether worst-case perfor-
Table 2. Black-box accuracy of models on CIFAR-10.
Source
Target RegularTraining
Label
Smoothing PGD ALP LRM (ours)
Regular Training 26.8% 32.0% 75.1% 73.9% 67.3%
Label Smoothing 66.7% 67.3% 75.6% 74.2% 67.6%
PGD [16] 69.8% 69.1% 58.0% 57.9% 55.7%
ALP [13] 69.4% 68.8% 60.8% 59.3% 56.4%
LRM (ours) 71.5% 70.9% 60.5% 59.4% 54.3%
Table 3. White-box accuracy of models on CIFAR-100.
Adversary
Training Method Natural FGSM PGD(5 steps)
PGD
(10 steps)
PGD
(20 steps)
Regular Training 59.1% 2.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Label Smoothing 55.0% 11.5% 2.3% 0.9% 0.2%
PGD [16] 50.2% 26.2% 27.2% 23.9% 23.6%
ALP [13] 44.9% 27.3% 28.3% 26.0% 25.9%
LRM (ours) 43.8% 28.1% 29.1% 26.8% 26.6%
mance is more important than performance on the original
unperturbed examples.
Next, black-box performance is shown in Table 2. As
is standard in most black-box evaluations of adversarial de-
fenses, this is performed by generating adversarial exam-
ples with one model (the “Source”) and evaluating them on
a separate independently trained model (the “Target”). In
this experiment, we use a 10-step PGD attack to generate
adversarial examples. As found in other works [16], the
success of a black-box attack depends both on how similar
the training procedure was between the source and target
models and on the strength of the source model – for exam-
ple, LRM uniformly results in a stronger black-box attack
than ALP [13], which itself is a uniformly stronger black-
box attack than adversarial training with PGD [16]. As
such, using LRM as the source mildly damages the black-
box defenses of PGD and ALP.
Interestingly, label smoothing was fairly effective as a
black-box defense, being among the most robust models
across all different sources. In particular, label smooth-
ing had the highest minimum performance across sources
(over 10% higher than any other method), which is partic-
ularly surprising given its near-zero cost compared to the
adversarially-trained models.
CIFAR-100 White-box performance on CIFAR-100 is
presented in Table 3. Again, we find that LRM achieves
the highest level of adversarial robustness to all adversar-
ial attacks, with ALP also strictly better than PGD-based
adversarial training. Interesting, though, we find that la-
bel smoothing completely fails to all attacks on CIFAR-100,
behaving almost completely differently than on CIFAR-10.
Although examining this was not the goal of our work, this
does highlight the importance of evaluating proposed adver-
sarial defenses on multiple datasets.
The corresponding results for black-box attacks on
CIFAR-100 are shown in Table 4, where we again find clear
differences across datasets. This time, the difference is that
all methods perform much more similarly to one another,
with the exception of clear differences of transferring from
PGD-trained models to non-adversarially trained models.
SVHN We demonstrate performance against white-box
attacks on SVHN in Table 5. Despite the large differences
in dataset scale, image type, and imbalance in class frequen-
cies, we again find that our method, LRM, is the most ro-
bust of all appoaches on every adversarial attack, with pat-
terns in the performance of each defense very similar to the
other datasets, providing additional evidence that our meth-
ods and insights are generalizable.
5.3. Evaluating Stronger Attacks
Evaluating adversarial defenses is difficult to do cor-
rectly – since evaluating against any attack merely pro-
vides an upper bound on adversarial robustness, it is crit-
ical to evaluate on the strongest attacks available to make
the bound as tight as possible. Furthermore, care must be
taken to avoid gradient masking or obfuscated gradients [2],
which can lead to a false sense of security.
Here we evaluate white-box performance on CIFAR-10
with two very strong attacks: a 1,000-step PGD adversary
(the same attack that ALP succumbed to on ImageNet), and
SPSA [28], a gradient-free attack that is effective at uncov-
ering gradient masking. Results are given in Table 6. Note
that SPSA is evaluated against a representative 1,000-image
sample of the evaluation set for efficiency, since a full eval-
uation would take roughly 90 hours, and that we use the
same evaluation settings as provided in [28].
We find nearly no difference when going from a 20-
step to a 1,000-step PGD attack for all methods except
for label smoothing, which loses most of its robustness.
This suggests that label smoothing, while providing only a
mild amount of worst-case adversarial robustness, can actu-
ally make the adversarial optimization problem much more
challenging, which we believe is also the underlying rea-
son for its effectiveness against black-box attacks. Based
on this conjecture, we also evaluated label smoothing as a
black-box defense with a 1,000-step PGD attack, where we
have found a much smaller drop in performance, going from
67.3% to 60.8%, confirming that label smoothing still has
its place in black-box defenses. The exact mechanism by
which label smoothing makes the search for adversarial ex-
amples more difficult, however, remains elusive, which we
think is an interesting avenue for further research.
On the other hand, an SPSA attack removes some of
the difference in robustness between PGD, ALP, and LRM .
While this illustrates that ALP and LRM are likely doing
some type of gradient masking in a way that PGD can-
not detect, even with 1,000 iterations, it also illustrates that
there is a real gain in adversarial robustness even when con-
sidering strong gradient-free attacks.
Table 4. Black-box accuracy of models on CIFAR-100.
Source
Target RegularTraining
Label
Smoothing PGD ALP LRM (ours)
Regular Training 33.3% 31.7% 50.1% 44.7% 43.8%
Label Smoothing 37.0% 31.6% 50.0% 44.8% 43.9%
PGD [16] 37.6% 34.0% 33.4% 32.5% 32.4%
ALP [13] 39.7% 36.6% 33.6% 31.5% 32.1%
LRM (ours) 37.7% 33.4% 34.5% 33.0% 31.3%
Table 5. White-box accuracy of models on SVHN.
Adversary
Training Method Natural FGSM PGD(5 steps)
PGD
(10 steps)
PGD
(20 steps)
Regular Training 96.7% 14.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Label Smoothing 97.0% 50.8% 15.1% 4.4% 1.3%
PGD [16] 85.3% 50.5% 47.3% 39.6% 38.0%
ALP [13] 82.5% 49.6% 47.1% 40.0% 38.6%
LRM (ours) 83.6% 51.5% 48.4% 40.9% 39.4%
Table 6. Evaluating models against the strongest white-box attacks
on CIFAR-10. SPSA is evaluated on a 1,000-image (10%) sub-
sample, and a 20-step PGD attack is provided for context.
Adversary
Training Method PGD(20 steps)
PGD
(1,000 steps) SPSA [28]
Regular Training 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Label Smoothing 34.4% 7.2% 8.9%
PGD [16] 45.3% 45.2% 45.4%
ALP [13] 48.5% 48.3% 46.1%
LRM (ours) 51.0% 51.1% 47.9%
6. Discussion
In this work, we have shown the usefulness of logit reg-
ularization for improving the robustness of neural models
of computer vision to adversarial examples. We first pre-
sented an analysis of adversarial logit pairing, showing that
roughly half of its improvement over adversarial training
can be attributed to a non-obvious logit regularization ef-
fect. Based on this, we investigated two other forms of logit
regularization, demonstrating the benefits of both, and then
presented an alternative method for adversarial logit pair-
ing that more cleanly decouples the logit pairing and logit
regularization effects while also improving performance.
By combining these logit regularization techniques to-
gether, we were able to create both a stronger defense
against white-box PGD-based attacks and also a stronger
attack against PGD-based defenses, both of which come at
almost no additional cost to PGD-based adversarial train-
ing. We also demonstrated the surprising strength of label
smoothing as a black-box defense and its paradoxical weak-
ness to highly-optimized white-box attacks.
We anticipate that future work will push the limits of
logit regularization even further to improve defenses against
adversarial examples, possibly drawing on techniques orig-
inally devised for other purposes [19]. We also hope
that these investigations will yield insights into training
adversarially-robust models without the overhead of multi-
step adversarial training, an obstacle that has made it chal-
lenge to scale up adversarial defenses to larger datasets
without very large computational budgets.
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